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Abstract 
Circumscription is a form of nonmonotonic reasoning, introduced by McCarthy (1997) as a 
way of characterizing defaults using second order logic. The consequences of circumscription are 
those formulas true in the minimal models under a pre-order on models. In the case of domain 
circumscription the pre-order was the sub-model relation. Formula circumscription (McCarthy, 1980. 
1986) is characterized by minimizing a set of formulas-ne model is preferred to another model 
when the extensions of the minimized formulas in the first are subsets of the extensions in the second. 
We show that the propositional version of formula circumscription can capture all pre-orders 
on valuations of finite languages. We consider the question of infinite languages, and give the 
corresponding representation theorems. We further show that there are natural defaults (inertia in 
temporal projection), captured by inductive definitions, that cannot be captured by circumscription 
in the first order case. 
Finally. contrary to previous claims, we show that propositional formula circumscription can 
capture all preferential consequence relations over finite propositional anguages, as defined by Kraus 
et al. (1990). Thus, in the finite propositional case, there is no restriction on the kinds of preferential 
defaults that circumscription can describe. 0 1998 Published by Elsevier Science B.V. All rights 
reserved. 
K~~~orrls: Circumscription; Expressive power; Nonmonotonic reasoning; Expressiveness of circumscription 
1. Introduction 
McCarthy’s circumscription [20] is the first application of the idea of relative likelihood, 
or preference between models, to nonmonotonic reasoning. There, he recognized that a 
natural way of representing defaults was to order states of the world, according to what 
we thought was the case, and then to choose the sentences true in the minimal models in 
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this order as our current beliefs. This has strong links to the notion of inductive definition 
and to the use of minimality as a definitional tool which is ever-present in mathematics. 
This basic idea has since been studied by many researchers. The original suggestion was 
to order models based on the size of their domain, preferring sub-models, analogously to 
mathematical induction. This was later changed to minimizing the extension of a predicate. 
and then of an arbitrary formula. 
The notion of minimal entailment has been considered by many researchers. It has one 
of its roots in Ramsey’s [25] definition of counterfactuals: 
(Ramsey Test) Accept a propositional of the form “if A then C” in a state of belief K if 
and only if the minimal change of K needed to accept A also requires accepting C. 
Since then the idea of representing counterfactuals using entailment in minimal models 
has been widely considered [ 14,281. Gardenfors [8,9], and Makinson [ 1 l] have considered 
similar themes in their work on belief revision, which has close connections with 
nonmonotonic reasoning [ 121. Shoham [27] was the first to examine the model theory 
of McCarthy’s idea of using minimal entailment for nonmonotonic reasoning. Since then, 
this notion of preferential entailment has become linked with approaches (71 based on 
characterizing nonmonotonicity through structural rules. 
Despite the large amount of interest the area has attracted, some of the basic questions 
about circumscription remain unanswered. What is circumscription’s expressive power? 
How do the various forms of circumscription proposed compare in expressive power? How 
should the expressive power of nonmonotonic systems be measured? 
In the next sections we attempt o answer these questions. We first consider the structural 
meaning of minimizing predicates or formulas. We find that minimizing a formula is 
equivalent to stating that the models that satisfy that formula are an upper-set of the pre- 
order on models. Using this idea, it immediately follows that all pre-orders are definable 
using circumscription in the finite propositional case. 
As the expressive power of first order logic with a fixed domain and propositional logic 
co-incide, this shows that circumscription captures all pre-orders on structures, for first 
order theories with a fixed domain. 
When we look at infinite languages, we see that the circumscription formula can only 
describe pre-orders that are the product of a finite and a discrete pre-order. 
Infinite languages, and infinite sets of minimized formulas can still not capture all pre- 
orders-only those pre-orders whose upper-sets have a basis, all of whose elements are 
finitely axiomatizable. Even if we minimize a countable set of infinitary formulas, we still 
cannot capture all pre-orders. 
We show that a generalization of circumscription, suggested by Lifschitz [ 1.51 is strictly 
more expressive than formula circumscription in the first order case. We show a default 
commonly used in reasoning about action cannot be captured by formula circumscription, 
but can be captured by Lifschitz’s generalized circumscription. 
Finally we look at preferential consequence relations as defined by Kraus et al. [ 131. We 
show that formula circumscription of propositional theories can capture all preferential 
consequence relations over finite propositional languages. Previously Kraus et al. [ 13, 
p, 1691 have claimed that circumscription was unable to characterize these relations. 
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Circumscription was among the first systems for nonmonotonic reasoning that was 
proposed. In recent years, it has been criticized for lack of expressive power, especially 
in comparison to approaches based on consequence relations. In this paper, we show that 
these criticisms were unfounded. 
2. Notation 
In this section we recap some notation we need concerning orders. 
Definition 1 (Pre-order). A pre-order, 6, on a domain D, is a binary relation that is 
transitive and reflexive; we denote a pre-order on D, as <n, we drop the subscript when 
the domain is obvious: 
Vd. d’. d” E D.d < d’ and d’ < d” imply cl < d” (transitivity), 
Vd E D.d < d (reflexivity). 
Definition 2 (Partial order). A partial order on a domain D is a pre-order that is anti- 
symmetric; we denote a partial order on D, as 50, we drop the subscript when the domain 
is obvious: 
Vd, d’ E D.d’ 5 d and d 5 d’ imply d = d’ (anti-symmetry). 
The discrete partial order on D is the identity on D. We say a pre-order is finite when 
its domain is finite. 
Definition 3 (Upper-set). An upper-set 3 of a pre-order < on a domain D is a subset of 
D that is upwards closed, that is 
Vd E 3, d’ E D.d < d’ implies d’ E 3. 
Upper-sets are sometimes called order-filters. 
Proposition 1. The jkzmily of all upper-sets of a pre-order <D is closed under arbitray 
unions and intersections. 
Proposition 2. Every set of sets X is closed under arbitru? unions and intersections is 
the,fumily of upper-sets of a unique pre-order <. 
Definition 4 (Busis). A basis B for F, a family of upper-sets of a pre-order 6, is a subset 
of F, such that every element of F is definable in terms of the intersection and union of 
elements of B: 
Vf E F.gbl.1, . . ..b.,,n E B. fi fi bi,j = f. 
i=l j=l 
Definition 5 (Minimal). An element d is said to be a minimal element in an order 6. on a 
domain D, if there is no element d’ E D such that d’ < d and d g d’. 
Minimal<(d) = d E D A Vd’ E D.d’ < d + d < d’. 
Definition 6 (Restriction). The restriction of a pre-order <I), to a subset D’ of D, is 
written, <JD~. 
3. The model theory of circumscription 
In this section we look at a commonly used form of circumscription. This version 
includes the modifications introduced by Lifschitz [16] in his reformulation of formula 
circumscription [22]. It also uses the device, introduced by de Kleer and Konolige [5], of 
fixing predicates by minimizing both the predicate and its negation. We define formula 
circumscription and its semantics in the propositional case. We then look at some of the 
properties of the pre-orders defined by circumscription. We see that they are not always 
partial orders, and that in the case of finite languages, minimal valuations always exist. 
We then see that the formulas true in the minimal models of this pre-order on models are 
exactly the consequences of circumscription. We then consider the question of what pre- 
orders circumscription can capture. As our first step towards this we look at how minimized 
formulas are related to the pre-order on models they generate. We see that the set of models 
of each minimized formula is an upper-set of the pre-order on models. We next show that 
the pre-order is the unique pre-order that has these upper-sets as a basis. This establishes 
the basic representation result for circumscription+very pre-order of the valuations of a 
finite propositional language can be captured by a circumscription policy. 
We then show the restriction to finite languages is necessary. 
3.1. Propositional formula circumscription 
McCarthy [22] introduced a form of circumscription, called formula circumscription. It 
extends predicate circumscription [21] in two ways. 
l The new form of circumscription allows the extensions of arbitrary formulas to be 
minimized rather than only minimizing predicates. 
l Certain predicates are allowed to be varied in the minimization process. This notion 
was suggested, but not explored, by [2 I]. 
Definition 7 (< on formulas). It is useful to introduce the notation ~1, y2 < 6 I .S2 for the 
formula (~1 + St) A (~2 + 82). 
Definition 8 (McCarthy [22]). If yt, y2 is a pair2 of formulas from a propositional 
language L, and PI. . . , P,, are the propositional letters in our language L, then we define 
the circumscription of cr, a formula in L minimizing yr . ~2, written Circ(a; yl, ~2) as 
follows. 
’ For notational simplicity we minimize two formulas, the extension to more formulas is the natural one. 
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We use CX’ to denote the formula, cr[$~l/P1,. . , $ln/Pn], that is the result of the 
replacement of the propositional letters P; in (Y by the propositional variables $i. 
C-wAbh . . . . . ~.n.[cy’Ay;.y;~yl.)/2]~)/l,M~l/;.~~ 
We use the notation CircLp when we wish to stress that the propositional letters in the 
language are the set P. This may differ from the letters that occur in (Y. 
3.2. Semantics of propositional circumscription 
Definition 9 ( Gr). Given a propositional language L, and a set of formulas f from L,, 
we define the relation Gr on the valuations of Lp as follows. 
We denote the truth value of a formula y in a valuation 2I as ‘u[y]. For any two valuations 
Q. 93, we write ‘u Gr 93 if 
U[y] = 1 implies %[y] = 1 for every y in r. 
We now look at some of the properties of <. It is a pre-order on the class of all valuations 
of a given propositional language. It is not in general a partial order as there are distinct 
valuations that are Gr than each other. 
Proposition 3. For a given propositional language L,, and a set offormulas f from L,, 
Gr is a pre-order but not always a partial order: 
Proof. That cr is a pre-order follows from the transitivity and reflexivity of implication. 
To show transitivity we assume that 
and show that this implies that 5Zl< C. To show that ‘21 < C‘, it suffices to show that for each 
y E r, if ‘zL[y] = 1, then C[y] = 1. Thus we assume that U[y] = 1 and show this implies 
C[v] = 1. 
As S!t < 113, then 
Q[y] = 1 implies 93[y] = 1. 
Therefore, %[v] = 1. But, also, as % < &, then C[y] = 1, as required. 
To show reflexivity, it is sufficient to show that if !2I[y] = 1 then !2l[y] = 1, which is 
immediate. 
To see that it is not always a partial order, let r be {PI, the language be L(p,~l. Then 
the two valuations Q, and !8, where 
%[P]=O, U[Q]=O. %[P]=O, %[Q]= 1. 
provide a counterexample to anti-symmetry. q 
As we considered earlier there are minimal elements in many pre-orders. Thus we can 
define the minimal models of a theory with respect to Gr. 
Proposition 4. Let (Y he a formula of L,, and r ajnite set offormulas of Ly. A valuation 
Q jar ajinite set ofpropositional letters P is a model ofCircL,(a; r), if and only if (21 is 
minimal in the set of models af cx with respect to Gr. 
Proof. We show the two propositions are inter-derivable. We first note that both 
propositions imply that Q is a model of (Y. We then show the second conjuncts of both 
are inter-derivable. 
= v23.93 + a! A (Vy E r.!B[y] --f Uly]) + (Vy E T.‘u[y] + %[y]) 
SE V$l( . . . , ~,~.~l~Il~I.....~nI~,l~ 
Yl[~lIPl~ .. . . ~,~/~,,l,...,Y,~~ll~l,...,llr,,l~,,l~Yl....,Y,~ 
Yl~...~~~/n~YII~lI~I...., !brlnlpn1>. . .? Y,,[~llPl1~~ .1 ?hnIP,zI. 
The first equivalence follows from the definition of Minimal. The second follows from 
the definition of <I-. The third equivalence is valid as a model can be viewed as a valuation 
function, and from the definition of satisfiability. Note this requires that there be only 
a finite number of propositional letters. The last formula is the second conjunct in the 
definition of circumscription. q 
Thus we have shown that minimal entailment over pre-orders on valuations describe cir- 
cumscription. The next obvious question is what pre-orders can circumscription capture? 
3.3. Characterization of minimized jarmulas 
We begin by relating the minimized formulas to properties of the pre-order, 
Proposition 5. Given a set r of formulas from a propositional language L,, the set oj 
models of each y E r is an upper-set of the pre-order < ‘. 
Proof. We need to show that the models of y are upward closed. Let r be a set of formu- 
las of a propositional language. Let y be an element of r. Let 2t be a model of y, and let 
!23 be a valuation such that U 6’ 23. We show that 93 /= y. As ‘u <’ 2-3 we have ‘u[y] = 1 
implies 23 [y 1 = 1 for every y in r . We have 2t /= y , by assumption. Therefore 93 b y as 
required. q 
This gives a structural interpretation of minimizing a formula. The set of models of a 
minimized formula is an upper-set of the pre-order on valuations. 
We now show that the pre-order < f is the pre-order with the fewest upper-sets that 
contains all the upper-sets in r. 
Proposition 6. Given a set r of formulas of a propositional language L, the pre-order 
Gr is the unique pre-order whose upper-sets include the models of each formula in r and 
whose set af upper-sets is minimal. 

3.4. First order,finite domains 
In Artificial Intelligence the case where we need only consider theories with domains 
smaller than a fixed size is often useful. For these structures the results for propositional 
languages with finite number of letters apply, by considering the well-known translation of 
fixed finite domain theories into propositional logic. 
Thus for fixed finite domain theories, formula circumscription can capture all pre-orders 
on structures. For the case where our theories have infinite models results are more difficult 
to come by. We no longer have categoricity, that is, we cannot specify a model up to 
isomorphism by a formula, or even a set of formulas. In our previous construction 7, we 
explicitly use the fact that every upper-set of the pre-order on models is axiomatized by a 
single formula. 
3.5. Injkitay cases 
Note that the restriction to finite propositional languages was necessary in the previous 
theorem. We give an example. 
Example 1. Let L be the propositional language containing the propositional letters 
P] , . . ( P, . . . ., II E w. Consider the following pre-order <I on L-valuations. Let one 
equivalence class S be the set of valuations where exactly one propositional letter is true. 
Let the other class 3 be the complement of this class. Let all elements of S be greater than 
every element of S. 
There is no formula v that is satisfied only in S. Let us suppose that there was. Choose 
a valuation that agrees with a valuation in S on all letters that are mentioned in the formula 
)/, but which is not in S. This valuation satisfies y, and is not in y, thus there is no formula 
y that is satisfied only in S. 
Thus for this pre-order, the set of non-empty, non-trivial upper-sets that are represented 
by formulas is empty. However, the empty set of formulas is also a basis for the discrete 
pre-order, the identity on the domain. 
Thus, there is no set of formulas f, such that <r = < 1. Any possible set of formulas r 
must contain only formulas whose sets of models are upper-sets of < 1, by Proposition 5. 
But the only formulas that are upper-sets of <I are tautologies and the negations of 
tautologies. Thus, r must be a set of tautologies and the negations of tautologies. But 
then <r is the discrete pre-order, not <I which shows that there is no set of formulas f, 
such that <r = <I. 
We can achieve an analogue of Theorem 7 for the infinite case, if we allow r to be 
infinite. For this analogue we need to add a restriction that certain upper-sets are finitely 
axiomatizable. This is necessary as shown above. 
Theorem 8. If < is a pre-order of the valuations of a propositional language Lp then 
there is a set of formulas r. such that 6 = < r if and only if there is a basis for the 
upper-sets of < where each element in the basis is finite& uxiomatizahle. 
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Proof. (+) We take the axiomatizations of the finitely axiomatizable upper-sets as our 
set r By Proposition 6 the pre-order Gr is the unique pre- order whose upper-sets include 
the models of each formula in r and whose set of upper-sets is minimal. Thus given a set 
of formulas r, that axiomatize a basis for a set of upper-sets, <r generates the pre-order 
with that set of upper-sets. As there is a finitely axiomatizable basis for the upper-sets of 
<, the finitely axiomatizable upper-sets of < ( which are axiomatized by r) form a basis. 
and thus <I- = <. 
(=+) We prove the contrapositive. 
Suppose there is no basis, all of whose members are finitely axiomatizable. Then 
consider all finitely axiomatizable upper-sets. Let these be r’. Then our assumption is 
that there is an upper-set 3, that is not definable in terms of the elements of unions and 
intersection of elements of r’. 
Every pre-order Gr with r c f’ does not contain 3, and thus is not equal to 6. Every 
pre-order Gr with f 2 r’ contains an upper-set axiomatized by some y that is not in r’. 
Therefore, <’ has some new y , whose set of models is an upper-set. However, this new y 
is linitely axiomatizable. and thus its set of models is not an upper-set of <, as all finitely 
axiomatizable upper-sets are elements of r’, by assumption. Thus Gr contains an extra 
upper-set and is not equal to <, as required. q 
This gives us a characterization of what minimizing infinite sets of formulas can capture. 
It is notable that the condition that there is a basis which is finitely axiomatizable is a 
weaker condition that every upper-set being finitely axiomatizable. 
3.6. Finite strings cfquantijiers 
In the above theorem we allow r to be infinite. If we wish to capture exactly what a 
circumscription formula can represent, we need to look at the case where r is finite, and 
where the number of universally quantified propositional variables in the circumscription 
formula is finite. 
We now give a representation theorem for circumscription. We characterize xactly those 
pre-orders that propositional formula circumscription can define. They are the pre-orders 
that can be factored into a finite pre-order and a discrete, or unconnected, pre-order. We 
first make the notion of the product of pre-orders precise and then state the result. 
Definition 10. Given a pre-order <[I and a pre-order < 111 the pre-order <nX ol = < 1) 
x <DJ is defined over all pairs (d. d’), d E D, d’ E D’, such that: 
Vd,,dz.d;.d;.dl <,&r\d; ~n~d~r(d,.Ll;)~nx,~~(~i2.d~). 
Lemma 9. If < is a pre-order on valuations of a lunguage Lp, and <’ is a pre-order on 
valuations of a language LF where p and 7 are disjoint then < x 6’ is isomorphic to a 
pre-order on vuluations of a language LpUp’. 
Proof. We consider the pair of valuations to be a single valuation over the union of the 
propositional letters. This is then a pre-order on valuations of LpU7. q 
We now define a pre-order <’ :” that betters captures the notion that the number of 
universally quantified variables in the circumscription formula is finite. P’ is a finite subset 
of the letters in the propositional language and corresponds to the letters replaced by 
variables in the circumscription formula. These can alternately be considered to the the 
letters that are varied (in the sense of [22]) in the minimization process. 
Definition 11 (Grip’ ). Given a propositional language L, and a finite set of formulas r 
in L, and a finite set F c P, we define the relation GrZP’ on the valuations of L, as 
follows. For any two valuations Q, C?3 on P, we write 53 GrZr’ (23 if 
0 ‘u[y] = 1 implies %3[1/] = 1 for every y in f. 
l !2l[P;] = B[ P;] for every Pi such that P; E P and P; +Y! P’. 
Here we give the representation theorem for propositional formula circumscription over 
propositional languages with infinite sets of propositional letters. 
Theorem 10. If < is LI pre-order on the valuations ofu propositionul language Lp then 
there is u set offormulas I- from LF and ujinite subset P’ of p, such that < = Grz p’ (t 
and only if there are pre-orders < f and <d on valuations of disjoint subsets oj’ P where 
<f isjnite und <d is discrete and < 2 (< + x &). 
Proof. (+) Let the two disjoint subsets of P be P’ and P - P’. Let valuations on P’ 
be ordered by <‘, this will be <,f. It is finite. as P’ is finite. Let <d be the identity on 
valuations on p - P’. This is a discrete order. 
We now need to show that the product of these pre-orders is the required 6. We consider 
two valuations % and !I3 ordered by 6. We show that they are ordered by <f x <d. By 
definition if ‘ZL and ?I3 are ordered, then they agree on all letters in 7 - P’. Thus, the 
restrictions of U and !I3 to the letters in P - P’ are ordered by <(I. Similarly if Q and 13 
are ordered, then by the second clause in the definition of <, their restriction to F are 
ordered by <f. 
If Cu and !I3 not ordered by <, a similar case analysis show that they either disagree on 
the valuations of the letters in P - 7, and are not ordered by &, or their restrictions to 
7 are not ordered by <f Therefore, &I x <,f Z <, as required. 
(+) We are given < f and <d. Take f to be a finite set of formulas such that < f = 6’. 
This exists by our earlier theorem. Let P’, be the disjoint subset of P that is ordered by < 1. 
We now need to show that < ‘:’ 
, 
= <. This follows from Lemma 9, and the fact 
that <t = Gr. and that Gr:” restricted to letters outside P is the identity on valu- 
ations. 0 
Thus we have shown that our propositional formula circumscription captures all pre- 
orders of a certain general class. Pre-orders over models have been proposed as a 
general semantic framework for nonmonotonic reasoning. Thus we have shown that 
circumscription captures this notion of nonmonotonic reasoning. 
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3.7. Injinite strings of quanti$ers 
In the last two theorems we saw that circumscription’s ability to define pre-orders 
was impaired by the finite nature of the the circumscription formula. It is possible to 
consider languages with infinitary connectives. Chapter 2 of [2] considers the propositional 
languages L,, , which allow countable conjunctions and disjunctions of formulas. These 
languages shed light on the treatment of the first order case. A countable conjunction can 
be viewed as a universal quantifier over a fixed domain. As circumscription only compares 
models which have the same domain, this notion seems appropriate. 
A direct investigation of the first order case seems difficult at this time, because of 
the difficulties that circumscription has in characterizing defaults about equality or the 
domain [6]. Neither domain closure, nor the unique names assumption are naturally 
captured in formula circumscription. Modifications to circumscription [ 17,261 that do 
capture these defaults have been proposed, but are significantly more complicated to 
analyze. 
Comparison to other approaches is also made difficult by the lack of a compelling 
treatment of the first order case in nonmonotonic consequence relations. Circumscription 
has a well developed treatment of the first order case of nonmonotonic reasoning. Current 
proposals for first order reasoning with consequence relations are much less developed. 
and are highly non-trivial [ 181. In particular many do not accept a Barcan like rule-rather 
there are competing proposals. some of which order domain objects [I], while other order 
structures [4]. 
The disadvantages of infinitary languages of this kind are that they do not have a 
complete proof system in the absence of infinitary proof rules. 
Not every pre-order is captured by a circumscription policy even if we allow infinitary 
logics and restrict ourselves to countable languages. 
Theorem 11 ([2, Theorem 15)). There e.Csts pre-orders 6 on valuations of a countable 
propositional language L,, that are not equul to any [we-order of the form Gr, where r 
is (1 countable set offormulas,from L,,,,,. 
4. Formula circumscription 
We now consider the first order case of circumscription. That is, we consider how we 
circumscribe first order theories. We do not treat functions and constants in the following 
as the generalization sheds no new light on our exposition. Thus our signatures will not 
contain any function or constant symbols. 
Definition 12 (6, -C on first order formulas). We introduce the notation ~1, y2 < 61.82 
fortheformula(VF.y)(Y) -+ St(X)) A (VT.y2(7) + 82(T)), and yt, y2 <6t,& forthe 
formula 
yl.~2/2~l,fi2A’(~I.S2~YI.1/2), 
where X and 7 are sequences of variables equal in number to the free variables of y1,61 
and ~2.82. 
Definition 13. If ye, y2 is a pair of 3 formulas of a first order language L, and PI is a 
predicate symbol’ of L, then the circumscription of a minimizing ~1, ~9, formulas in L, 
varying PI, written Circ~(ff: ye I ~2; PI ) is, 
where $1 is a predicate variable equal in arity to PI. We use a’ to denote the formula, 
a[$~ /PI], that is the replacement of the predicate PI in ty by a predicate variable $1. 
We now introduce the semantics for formula circumscription. 
Definition 14. Let cy be a sentence of L, a first order language with equality, whose 
predicates are PI ? . . . , l’,,. Let Z be a subset of PI, . . . , P,. A model Q of cy is a 
VI,..‘, y,?; Z-sub-model of a model 58, written 53 <:Yl..,.,yfl:’ !B9 if and only if: 
l IJBJI = /1%11, where II’UII denotes the universe of 0, 
l U[l/i] S 23[vi], for i = I. . . , n. where %[yi] is the int~~retation of yi in 2, 
l ‘%[K] = B[K], for every predicate constant not in Z. 
rU is a ~1. . . , ytl; Z-minimal model of a if and only if it is a minimal model of a! under 
<v1....JG,:z 
Thus, as in the propositional case, every circumscription policy is a finite set of formulas, 
and it gives rise to a pre-order. 
We now consider another way of defining pre-orders on L-structures. We first need the 
notion of a disjoint union of structures. 
Definition 15. Let L be a first order language, with predicates PI, . . . , Prl, If !?X and 9J 
are .!, structures with the same universe, then we define the disjoint union of EJX and 
V? to be a first order structure D over a language PI. . . . . P,,. P;, . . . P,:, such that the 
interpretation of Pi in !.7X is the interpretation of Pi in D and the interpretation of Pi in 3 
is the interpretation of P: in 0. 
We now define what a first order d~~rl~b~~ pre-order on L-structures is. 
Definition 16. Let L be a first order language, with predicates PI, . . . , f,*, and 6 a pre- 
order 01% structures of L. We say that < is@sf order de~?l~l7le if there is a first order formula 
Q, in a language PI, . . . Ptt, P;, _ . ~ Pi, such that if 9.X and 9’X are L structures, with the 
same domain, then the disjoint union of 331 and 9? models $ exactly when 93 < %. 
We can now show that everyfim order d~~~z~bf~ pre-order is captured by a second order 
sentence, of the same complexity class as circumscription. They each have only universal 
second order quantifiers, and are thus 37{, or inductive definitions [24]. 
Theorem 12. Lef L he u,first oP-der l~~~ui~~~, with ~red~cuf~,~ PI. . . P,,, md < a first 
order definable pre-order on structuws of L. 
3 We minimize a pair for simplicity. The extension to an arbitrary finite number is the natural one. 
’ We choose OX predicate symbol for simplicity again. 
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Let A[ Pi, . . PL] be a formula of second order logic, without second order quantijers, 
with n second order variables P:, .for i < n. 
Then there is LI sentence of second order logic @ with only universal second order 
quunt$ers whose consequences are the formulas entuiled in the < minimal models of 
A[Pi/PI/. PJ/Pi]. 
Proof. Let 4 be the witness of thejirst order dejinubility of <, with its 2 * n free predicate 
variables being P:, . . . , PL, P;‘, . . , Pi. 
If @[Pi/ Pi’, Pi / Pj] represents the simultaneous replacement of every Pi by <.{, and Pi 
by Pi then, 
A[P;/Pil]~tlPi,.... P,:.[AA~[Pi/P:‘l]~~[P’/P:‘, P,/Pj] 
is the required sentence. q 
Formulas of the above form has been called generalized circumscription by Lifschitz 
[ 151. Here rather than a set of formulas to minimize, we have a formula, with twice as many 
free predicate variables as the language has predicate constants, that defines the required 
pre-order. 
We now show that circumscription cannot capture all first order axiomatizable pre-orders 
by considering an example. The following example is more complicated than it need be. 
However, as it currently is it represents a widely used default, rather than a concocted 
example. 
It is the standard order on structures that captures the default used in temporalprojection. 
It uses the situation calculus [23], a formalism for reasoning about change. It is a three 
sorted language, with situations s, fluents f, and actions a. The predicate holds( f, s) states 
that the fluent f holds at situation .F, while the function result(u. s) gives the situation 
resulting from doing the action u in situation s. A predicate ub(u. f, s) states that the 
fluent .f‘ changed between s and result(u, s). This order on models has been proposed 
by Reiter and Lin [19] and Giunchiglia [lo] and Costello [3]. It is widely accepted 
to be the correct solution to the frame problem for problems involving only temporal 
projection. 
Example 2. Consider a pre-order 6 on first order structures. Let the language of these 
structures have three sorts, fluents, actions and situations. The language has two predicates, 
holcls which is a predicate on fluent situation pairs, and ub which is a predicate on action, 
fluent, situation triples. It also contains a function from action situation pairs to situations, 
result, and a situation constant SO. 
Let 331 and g be first order structures for this language. We say that 9X < fl, when if 
F, A, S are the universes of fluents, actions and situations, in both 9X and %, and !7_Jl[ P] is 
the interpretation of P in !JX then 
Vs E S. J” E F. a E A.(Vf E F.(f’, s) E !IX[holds] iff (,f’, s) E n[holds]) and 
(n, f, ,Y) E %Jl[ub] implies (a, f, s) E M[ub] 
We do not relate structures with different universes. 
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We note that this is clearly afirst order de$nable pre-order on models, as the formula 
(Vf’.holds(f’, s) = holds’(f’, s)) A ab(a. f, s) + ab’(u. f. s) 
is the required witness. 
This pre-order has an uncountable anti-chain when all the universes, F. A, S are 
countable. Further, this pre-order has 2*“” upper-sets when all the universes, F. A, S, are 
countable. 
We note that the structures that have a different interpretation of hf.holds(f, SO) are 
incomparable. Further, every set of structures, for a given triple of universes, which agree 
on the interpretation of h,f.holds(,f, SO) form an upper-set. These upper-sets are all clearly 
disjoint. There are 2no distinct interpretation of hf.holds(,f. SO) and thus there are 2**” 
distinct upper-sets. 
Proposition 13. The set of upper-sets of the preorder generated by a first order 
circumscription policy, restricted to structures with u given countable universe, has 
curdinulity bounded by 2”). 
Proof. A basis for the upper-sets is given by all instantiations into the minimized formulas. 
There are at most a countable number of distinct formulas that result from this, as the 
universe is countable, and the set of formulas is finite, and thus has a finite number of free 
variables. If the upper-sets of a pre-order have a countable basis, then there are at most 2’” 
upper-sets, as every upper-set is the result of unions and intersections of upper-sets in the 
basis. q 
Theorem 14. There are first order dejnuble pre-orders on of$rst order structures not 
captured by circumscription. 
Proof. Immediate from Proposition 13 and Example 2. q 
This is relevant because the example above that circumscription cannot capture 
is a natural default that has been used in reasoning about action, a domain where 
circumscription has been widely applied. 
5. Consequence relations 
We now compare propositional circumscription to another proposal for characterizing 
nonmonotonicity. This other proposal, nonmonotonic consequence relations [ 131 has its 
roots in conditional logic [29]. It differs from conditional logic in two notable ways. It 
studies only un-nested conditionals, and secondly, it is concerned in ways of completing 
sets of conditionals. These completions, such as rational closure, do not concern us 
here. 
Definition 17. A preferential consequence model M over a finite language L, is a triple 
( W, 1, 4)) where W is a set of states, 1 : W H 2’ assigns a valuation on -f’ to each state, 
and + is a strict partial order on W. The valuation 1 (w) is called the label of a state w. 
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This is exactly Definition 5.6 of [13], save that as we consider only finite languages, we 
do not have a smoothness condition. 
The preferential consequence relation, corresponding to a ptvferential consequence 
model (W. 1, <) is a binary relation ]_ on formulas of Lp, such that cx I_ B, when B is 
true in all the minimal states of the partial order -C restricted to states w whose labels, 
1( w ) model (II. This is exactly Definition 3.13 of [I 31. Thus, o 1_ /? corresponds to minimal 
entailment in a preferential consequence model. It is notable that states, which are labeled 
with models are ordered, rather than models. In order to capture preferential consequence 
relations Kraus et al. showed that this distinction is necessary. as there are preferential 
consequence relations all of whose models contain two states that are labeled with the 
same valuation. 
We now show that we can capture all preferential consequence relations using 
circumscription 
Theorem 15. Let k be a preferential consequence relation, over a finite propositional 
language L,. There is a finite set of new propositional letters p, and a finite set qf 
,formulas r in LuU~, and a formula /I E LTF;~F, such that,for allfonnulas cx, 4 E L,, 
Proof. We first choose a sufficiently large set of new propositional letters F. We then 
specify our finite set of formulas f and our formula p. We then show that the equivalence 
holds. 
Firstly, we use the fact that every preferential consequence relation has a finite model. 
We can thus choose a finite model M = (W, 1, -c). Let the number of states in this model 
M be n We let p/ be a set of [log, nl new propositional letters. 
To each state 1u in W we associate a distinct subset of p. Let l’(w) give the set 
associated with w. There is a set of subsets that are not associated with any state. Let 
this set of subsets be E. 
We now generate a pre-order over a subset of the models of LpUp’. We do this by 
associating a model of LpU~ with every state in W, denoting the model associated with a 
state w as L(u)). The model associated with a state w has the same valuation as the label 
of the state I( UJ) on the propositional atoms in 7, and has the valuation I’(w) on the letters 
in P’. 
No states are associated with the same model, as every distinct state has a distinct 
valuation over the set P’. 
We now order these models, setting L(zo) < L(w’) when w + w’. We let ,9 be an 
axiomatization of the range of L, that is, the models that are associated with some state 
in W. 
S is a partial order on models of @. By Theorem 7 we can find a set of formulas r. such 
that <r restricted to the models that satisfy p is <. 
We have specified P’, b and I-. We now show that the equivalence 
(11 -4 ifandonlyif Circ(crr\~; f)k4 
holds for all CY, 4 E L,. 
Let the minimal states whose labels model (Y be N. The two orders -C and <r restricted 
to /I models are isomorphic. Also I(zu) + o if and only if L(zu) b CX, as L(zu) and I(zu) 
agree on all letters from P, and (;Y is in L,. Therefore, the minimal models of ,!I under 
<r that model (;Y are the image of N under L. But, 4 is in L,, and 4 is satisfied in the 
minimal states whose labels model (Y exactly when 4 is satisfied in the image of N under 
L. Therefore, the minimal models of CI A p under <r model 4 exactly when 4 is true in 
the labels of the minimal states whose labels model CX, as required. q 
5. I. Discussion 
The previous theorem is in strong contrast to Kraus et al. claim that [13, p. 1691: 
The framework of preferential models, therefore, has an expressive power that cannot 
be captured by negation as failure, circumscription, default logic or autoepistemic logic. 
We have shown that circumscription can capture all preferential models over finite 
propositional languages. The restriction to finite propositional languages is not a severe 
restriction, as Kraus et al. make the assumption of compactness. 
The construction in the proof above essentially uses the introduction of new proposi- 
tional letters. This is common in circumscription-often new letters called ab’s are intro- 
duced. 
6. Conclusion 
We have shown that minimizing a certain formula v corresponds to stating that, in 
minimal models semantics, the set of models that satisfy 1/ is an upper-set of the pre- 
order on models. We show that all finite pre-orders on models are representable by formula 
circumscription. We show how the result extends to the infinite case, both in terms of 
languages and in terms of infinitary connectives and strings of quantifiers. 
We have explained what the meaning of minimizing a formula is, in terms of the 
model theory of circumscription. This greatly clarifies why we minimize certain formulas, 
and make finding a circumscription policy for a particular pre-order trivial. The correct 
formulas to minimize are those that correspond to a basis for the family of upper-sets. 
This paper does not suggest using this connection to implement nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Rather the paper is an investigation into the theory of a particular form of nonmonotonic 
reasoning, so that its strengths and weaknesses can be better understood. 
We show that generalized circumscription as conceived by Lifschitz [ 151 is strictly 
stronger in expressive power than formula circumscription, and this extra expressive power 
is necessary to capture the default of inertia in temporal projection. 
Finally we have shown that circumscription is as expressive as preferential consequence 
relations, in contrast to previous claims. 
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